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Freezing the Boundry Dividing Federal
and State Interests in Offshore
Submerged Lands
NORMAN A. WULF*
The Commission recommends that the Congress establish a National
Seashore Boundary Commission to fix the baseline from which to
measure the territorial sea and areas covered by the Submerged
Lands Act of 1953 .... The boundary lines should be described
in terms of geographic or plane coorindates for each State. The
determination of the Boundary Commission should be subject to
appropriate judicial review.1
No matter how the seabed is divided between national and inter-
national claimants, the United States will still be faced with dividing
its portion of the seabed between the federal government and the
states. The Submerged Lands Act in 1953 granted to the States a
portion of the United States seabed. However, since that grant, not
one State has had the boundary separating State from federal inter-
ests completely delimited. One and one-half billion dollars has been
impounded since 1956 in disputes between the United States and
Louisiana over ownership of offshore lands.2 In 1969, the Supreme
* Iowa Wesleyan College, B.A.; University of Iowa, J.D.; University of
Miami, Fla., L.L.M. LCDR Wulf is assigned to the International Law Divi-
sion of the Office of the Judge Advocate General of the Navy.
The views expressed in this article are those of the author and not neces-
sarily those of the Department of the Navy or the Department of Defense.
1. Commission on Marine Science, Engineering and Resources, OuR NA-
TION AND THE SEA 63 (1969) thereinafter cited as COMSER].
2. Report of the Panel on Management and Development of the Coastal
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Court after devoting sixty-three pages to delimitation of the coast-
line of Louisiana still had to refer portions of the dispute to a
Special Master whose report will thereafter be reviewed by the
Court.3 California, which was the focal point of the ownership con-
troversy in 1946, still is doubtful as to where her submerged land
boundaries are located with the result that exploitation of these
lands is seriously impeded. Five hundred acres of valuable sub-
merged lands off the California coast presently are disputed because
of some offshore rocks. If these rocks are more dry than wet during
low-tide, the disputed acreage goes to California; if more wet than
dry, the federal government gets these lands. Neither the federal
nor the state government, however, will get this acreage perma-
nently because these rocks shift and sea level varies.4
Maine has issued exploratory concessions in lands as far as eighty
miles from her coast.5 A motion by the United States to file a com-
plaint against the State of Maine in an original action before the
Supreme Court has been granted.6 All Atlantic coastal states have
been made parties to this action.
One commentator optimistically estimates that under present tech-
niques it will take at least twenty more years to settle the submerged
land boundaries of all States. 7 However, the federal-state sub-
merged land boundaries are drawn from the ambulating coastline.
With constantly changing shorelines, "this painstaking work [of de-
limitation] cannot provide a means of marking the boundary for
all time.' 8  Thus even twenty years from now, submerged land
boundaries will not be settled.
Zone, 1 PANEL REPORTS Or H COINISSION ON IMAINE SCIENCE, ENGINEERING
AN RESOURCES Ill-i, at IHI-119 (1969) [hereinafter cited as PANEL REPORT].
3. United States v. Louisiana, 394 U.S. 11 (1969).
4. Hortig, Report on the Jurisdictional, Administrative and Technical
Problems Related to the Establishment of California and Other State
Coastal and Offshore Boundaries, TmID ANmuAL LAW OF THE SEA INST. 294,
296 (1969); FouRTH ANNUAL LAW OF TiE SEA INST. 409, 410-11 (1970).
5. Browning, Some Aspects of State and Federal Jurisdiction in the
Marine Environment, TH m ANNuAL LAW OF T=E SEA INST. 89, 114 (1968).
6. United States v. Maine, 395 U.S. 955 (1969). On June 8, 1970, the
Supreme Court granted motions seeking the appointment of a Special
Master. Senior Judge Albert B. Moris of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit was appointed. United States v. Maine, 90 S. Ct. 1864
(1970).
7. Griffin, Coastal States' Offshore Boundaries: Status and Problems,
Off. Proc. of the Conf. on the Sea and the States 6, 18 (1968).
8. United States v. Louisiana, 394 U.S. 11, 85 (1969) (Black, J., dis-
senting).
This changing coastline with the resultant changing federal-state
boundary evoked the following criticism from Justice Black:
A company having an oil lease now under ocean waters.., gets no
more than an ambulatory title; here today and gone tomorrow.
And with its title, I suppose, will go all of its expensive invest-
ment in developing the lease. Stable business cannot be fostered
that way. The ambulatory title, which the Court finds in the Sub-
merged Lands Act, I think frustrates the just expectations Congress
desired that oil companies have in the stability of their leases for
exploitation of oil under the sea.9
The proposal of the Marine Science Commission would resolve the
ambulatory boundary by fixing it "once and for all in terms of geo-
graphic coordinates that can be portrayed on maps, rather than in
terms of distances from the coasts."' 0
The primary source material relied upon by the Commission of
Marine Science, Engineering and Resources in formulating it con-
clusions was the Report of the Panel on Management and Develop-
ment of the Coastal Zone"l which sets forth alternate solutions
to the federal-state boundary problem.12 The Panel suggested fed-
eral-state recognition of each others' leases, by which each sovereign
recognizes leases validly issued by the other, with payments ap-
portioned between the two sovereigns according to the shifting
boundary. Such an arrangement was instituted between the United
States and Louisiana in 1956. This arrangement, however "was
far from satisfactory, not only because it withholds needed revenues
and requires very detailed accounting but also because of various
problems that will confront lessees whose leases turn out to be
divided by the boundary as ultimately established."'18 Also sug-
gested by the Panel was joint federal-state offshore leasing and
use of straight baseline segments. The Panel, however, opted for,
and the Commission adopted, a recommendation that Congress
establish a "National seashore boundary commission, judicial in
nature ... to hear and determine seashore boundary questions
and controversies involving proprietary interests of the States under
Federal grants to them."' 4 The Panel felt that a separate judicial
commission to determine this boundary was essential because of
deficiencies in the present system and to expedite determination
of boundaries.' 5
9. Id. at 84 (Black, J., dissenting).
10. COMSER, supra note 1, at 62.
11. Id. at vii.
12. PANEL REPORT, supra note 2, at 111-120.
13. Swarth, Offshore Boundary Problems, Off. Proc. of the Conf. on the
Sea and the States 20, 25 (1968).
14. PANEL REPorT, supra note 2, at I1-121.
15. At present there is no procedure by which the federal government
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The determination of state-federal submerged land boundaries
recommended by this Commission was to be based on "present prin-
ciples of coastal boundary determination."' 6 When fixed by this
Commission, coastal boundaries would be defined in terms of geo-
graphical plane coordinates. Boundaries established by this Com-
mission, or by the Supreme Court in the event of appeal, would be
established permanently.17 The Panel recommended, but the Com-
mission rejected, a proposal that this stabilization apply only to own-
ership of submerged lands or resources, "not to general political
jurisdiction and authority."' 8
Examination of the federal-state submerged land controversy will
provide the "present principles of coastal boundary determination."
International and domestic implications of establishing a fixed
boundary will thereafter be explored.
I. PRESENT PRINCIPLES
A. The California case
Beginning in 1921, California and several other coastal states
under claim of ownership began granting oil and gas leases to cer-
can enter into agreements with the States except by concurrent legislation
or consent decree. Swarth has made a similar observation stating "a
boundary determination acceptable to federal officials at one time could be
renounced by [different officials] later." Swarth, supra note 13, at 22. If
the parties are in agreement, use of court proceedings is improper since
there is no real controversy nor should the Supreme Court be asked or
expected to exercise its original jurisdiction unless the controversy is of
broad general importance. The Panel further recommended that Congress
give its consent to State suits against the United States. States would then
be allowed to initiate boundary cases before the Commission. PANEL RE-
PORTS, supra note 2, at M11-121.
Of the eighteen lateral boundaries between the States, only the line be-
tween Florida and Alabama is completely and unambiguously delimited
while the lines between New Hampshire-Massachusetts, California-Ore-
gon, and Oregon-Washington are substantially delimited. In other cases de-
limiting language is almost completely lacking. Griffin, Delimitation of
Ocean Space Boundaries Between Adjacent Coastal States of the United
States, TmIRD A.NuAL LAW OF THE SEA INST. 142 (1968). Therefore, the
Panel, and thereafter the Commission, recommended that the National Sea-
shore Boundaries Commission also determine lateral State boundaries.
The Panel recommended that 28 U.S.C.A. § 1251(a) which gives the Su-
preme Court exclusive jurisdiction to hear and determine cases between
States be amended. PANEL IREPORT, supra note 2, at MI1-121.
16. PANEL REPORT, supra note 2, at Il-121.
17. COMSER, supra note 1, at 63; PANEL REPORT, supra note 2, at M11-121.
18. Id.
tain submerged lands lying off their coasts and levied taxes upon
interests in and improvements on these lands.19 The claim of State
ownership to these submerged lands was founded in part on an
1845 decision by the Supreme Court in Polard's Lessee v. Hagan
which held that the states owned lands underlying navigable
waters within their jurisdictions. 20  That decision stated in dictum
that if State boundaries extended out from the coastline, State
ownership of submerged lands extended into the sea to these
boundaries.21 The federal government, after years of vacillation
about the propriety of State claims to oil and gas in these offshore
areas, on October 22, 1945,22 took action to have the federal-state
claims adjudicated. On that date, the motion of the United States
to file a bill of complaint against the State of California in an
original action was granted by the Supreme Court.28 The outcome
of this litigation, United States v. CaZifornia was a 6-2 decision
finding that the federal government had "paramount rights" in
the three-mile territorial sea along the California coast, "an inci-
dent to which is full dominion over the resources of the soil under
that water area, including oil.' '24 In finding that the State did
not have title to the submerged lands off their coasts, the Court
stated that California had not perfected any ownership rights prior
to entry into the Union nor did California obtain any rights by the
"equal footing" clause since California failed to establish that the
19. H.R. REP. No. 695, 82d CoNG., 1ST Sss. (1951).
20. 44 U.S. (3 How.) 212 (1845).
21. Id. at 230. See Manchester v. Massachusetts, 139 U.S. 240, 264
(1891) where the Supreme Court said:
The extent of territorial jurisdiction of Massachusetts over the sea
adjacent to its coast is that of an independent nation; and, except
so far as any right of control over this territory has been granted
to the United States, this control remains with the State.
22. One month earlier, President Truman on September 28, 1945, pro-
claimed on behalf of the United States a unilateral claim to the natural
resources of the continental shelf contiguous to the coasts of the United
States. Proc. No. 2667, 1945 DEPT. OF STATE BULL. 484-87, 59 Stat. 884 (1945).
23. United States v. California, 326 U.S. 688 (1945). The Constitution
provides, "In all cases . . .in which a State shall be Party, the Supreme
Court shall have original jurisdiction." U.S. CoNsT. art. 3, § 2, cl.2.
24. 332 U.S. 19, 39 (1947). The order and decree entered subsequently
states inter alia:
1. The United States of America is now, and has been at all times
pertinent hereto, possessed of paramount rights in, and full do-
minion and power over, the lands, minerals and other things under-
lying the Pacific Ocean lying seaward of the ordinary low-water
mark on the coast of California, and outside if the inland waters,
extending seaward three nautical miles and bounded on the north
and south, respectively, by the northern and southern boundaries of
the State of California. The State of California has no title thereto
or property interest therein, United States v. California, 332 U.S.
804, 805 (1947).
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other states had perfected any ownership.25 The Court, therefore,
felt free to determine whether the 1845 case enunciating state
ownership of submerged lands ought to be interpreted as applying
to lands lying seaward of the low-water mark. The Court found
the three-mile territorial sea was vital to national security and
commerce and that these interests were the responsibility of the
federal government. California, the Court held, had qualified
ownership of lands under "inland navigable waters such as rivers,
harbors and even tidelands down to the low-mark," but "national
interests, responsibilities, and therefore national rights are para-
mount in waters lying seaward [of the low-water mark] in the
three mile belt. '26
In subsequent litigation by the United States against Texas and
Louisiana, the Court made it clear that no exceptions to the Califor-
nia rule would be allowed. Louisiana, by statute, had enlarged her
state boundaries in 1939 to extend twenty-seven miles into the Gulf
from her coastline.27 In United States v. Louisiana, the Court reaf-
firmed its decision in the California case and found that if the three-
mile territorial sea is in the "domain of the Nation," it follows "a
fortiori that the ocean beyond that limit also is."'28  The Court did
not deal with the consequences of Louisiana's boundary in relation
to persons other than the United States, but held that the United
States vis a vis Louisiana had paramount rights in resources under-
lying the Gulf of Mexico seaward of the low-water line and outside
inland waters of Louisiana. 29
Texas, attempting to avoid application of the California decision,
argued in United States v. Texas that she was a sovereign prior to
annexation into the Union and that she had perfected ownership of
lands seaward of the low-water line to a distance of three leagues.
The Supreme Court held that when Texas came into the Union on an
25. United States v. California, 332 U.S. 19, 29-39 (1947). The Court
essentially said neither the United States nor California had established
that States did or did not own submerged lands off their coast; therefore,
the States lose. This is an obvious shifting of the burden of proof from that
enunciated in Manchester v. Massachusetts, 139 U.S. 240, 264 (1891), quoted
supra note 21.
26. Id. at 30, 36.
27. 6 LA. GN. STAT. §§ 9311, 1-9311.4 (Dart 1939).
28. 339 U.S. 699, 705 (1950).
29. Id. at 706. Decree entered, 340 U.S. 899 (1950).
"equal footing" with the other States "any claim that Texas may
have had to the marginal sea was relinquished to the United
States. ' 30 Clearly, the Court would not honor any State claims to
lands seaward of the low-water mark. The States owned the lands
underlying inland waters and tidelands to the low-water mark. The
United States had paramount rights to lands seaward of the low-
water mark and outside inland waters.
B. Submerged Lands Act of 1953
Congress, however, did not agree with the Court's conclusion that
United States' security and commerce interests required federal right
to the resources of these submerged lands. In 1952, a bill was sent to
the President which relinquished all federal interests in lands lying
outside of inland waters or beyond the low-water mark to the adja-
cent coastal states.31 President Truman vetoed this legislation and
no attempt was made to override.32 However, on May 22, 1953, Pres-
ident Eisenhower approved the Submerged Lands Act of 195333
which recognized a limited State interest in offshore lands.
This Act relinquished to the coastal States all rights of the United
States to "lands beneath navigable waters within state boundar-
ies."34 By defining these terms, the Act confirmed State ownership
of lands beneath internal waters and lands between the high and
low-tide lines. The definitional section further granted to the States
lands from the low-water line or the line marking the seaward limit
of inland waters seaward three geographical miles. Furthermore, a
State could claim beyond three miles if it had a greater boundary at
the time the State became a member of the Union or if Congress had
approved a boundary in excess of three miles prior to May 22, 1963,
"but in no event shall the term 'boundary' or the term 'lands beneath
navigable waters' be interpreted as extending from the coastline
more than three geographical miles into the Atlantic or Pacific
Ocean, or more than three marine leagues into the Gulf of Mex-
ico."35 The constitutionality of this Act was challenged by both Ala-
bama and Rhode Island asserting that these submerged lands were
inherent to national sovereignity and could not be parceled out to the
States. In a per curiam decision, the Court found that the Act was
constitutional, stating that the power the Constitution confers on
30. 339 U.S. 707, 718 (1950), decree entered, 340 U.S. 900 (1950).
31. S.J. Res. 20, 82nd Cong., 2d Sess., 98 CoNG. REC. 6251 (1952).
32. S. REP. No. 133, 83rd Cong., 1st Sess., U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News
1474, 1489 (1953).
33. 67 Stat. 29, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1315 (1964).
34. 43 U.S.C. § 1311 (1964).
35. 43 U.S.C. § 1301(b) (1964).
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Congress to dispose of property belonging to the United States is
without limitation.36
Subsequently, the United States attempted to clarify ownership
of submerged land resources in the Gulf of Mexico by instituting suit
against all five Gulf States seeking a declaration that the United
States had superior rights to all natural resources from lands under-
lying the Gulf more than three geographical miles seaward from the
coast of each State. In United States v. Louisiana, decided in 1960,
the Court held that Mississippi, Alabama and Louisiana were entitled
under the Act to only three miles of land underlying the Gulf mea-
sured "from the line of ordinary low-water and the outer limit of in-
land waters."3 7 Texas, however, was entitled to the resources of lands
lying three marine leagues from the line of ordinary low-water or the
outer limit of inland waters.38 Florida also was entitled under the
Act to three marine leagues underlying the Gulf measured from her
coastline as defined above.39
C. Base line defined
Subsequent litigation centered upon determining the base line
from which to measure the three-mile or three-league grants to the
States. In United States v. California° the Court was faced with de-
'fining the coastline and the term "inland waters." The Submerged
Lands Act gave California rights to seabed resources at a breadth of
three miles measured from "the seaward limit of inland waters"41
but nowhere did the Act define inland waters. A review of the legis-
lative history of the Act demonstrated to the Court that the intent of
Congress was that the Court should define the term "inland waters."
The Court sought the "best and most workable definitions available"
to determine the seaward limit of inland waters and adopted the defi-
nitions set forth in the Convention on the Territorial Sea and the
36. Alabama v. Texas, 347 U.S. 272, 274 (1954). The Constitution states
"The Congress shall have Power to dispose of .. .property belonging to
the United States. . . ." U.S. CoNsT. art. 4, § 3, cl. 2.
37. 363 U.S. 1, 83 (1960).
38. Id. at 84.
39. United States v. Florida, 363 U.S. 121 (1960). A final decree was
subsequently entered for all five Gulf States. United States v. Louisiana,
363 U.S. 502 (1960).
40. 381 U.S. 139 (1965).
41. 43 U.S.C. § 1301(c) (1964).
Contiguous Zone.42  Utilizing the Convention's terms, the Court
found that the Convention authorized nations to use straight base
lines, but did not require it. Since the United States had not utilized
this method for purposes of delimiting the territorial sea, the indi-
vidual States could not use straight base lines to delimit inland wa-
ters for purposes of the Act.43 To determine whether a body of wa-
ter qualified as a bay, the twenty-four mile closing rule together with
the semicircle test were to be used.44  States may establish that
bodies of water are historic inland waters even though opposed by
the federal government, but California did not present sufficient evi-
dence of continuous exclusive assertion of dominion. 45 Anchorages
which are beyond outer harbor works of harbors are not to be con-
sidered inland waters. Open roadsteads used for loading, unloading
and anchoring ships are considered in Article 9 of the Convention as
territorial waters and not inland waters for drawing base lines. 40
Outermost permanent harbor works that form an integral part of the
harbor system within the meaning of Article 8 of the Convention are
part of the coastline.47
As to the term "line of ordinary low water" used in the Submerged
Lands Act, the Court found that Article 3 in the Convention used
"low-water line along the coast as marked on large-scale charts
officially recognized by the coastal State." The Court stated that the
lines referred to in the Act and the Convention "were meant to con-
form" and noting that on the Coast and Geodetic Survey coastal
charts "lower low water" is marked, the Court adopted lower low
water.
4 8
Although not expressly stated in the Convention, the Court found
that artificial structures "were clearly recognized in international
42. United States v. California, 381 U.S. 139, 157-65 (1965). The text of
the Convention is set forth in 15 U.S.T. 1607, T.I.A.S. No. 5639.
43. United States v. California, 381 U.S. 139, 167-69 (1965).
44. Id. at 169-72.
45. Id. at 172-75. The Court stated "We are reluctant to hold that such a
disclaimer [by the United States] would be decisive in all circumstances,
for a case might arise in which historic evidence was clear beyond doubt."
Id. at 175.
46. Id. at 175.
47. United States v. California, 382 U.S. 448 (1966) (Supplemental De-
cree).
48. United States v. California, 381 U.S. 139, 176 (1965). The Decree
subsequently entered states that coastline means:(a) The line of mean lower low water on the mainland, on is-
lands, and on low-tide elevations lying wholly or partly within
three geographical miles from the line of mean lower low water
on the mainland or on an island; and(b) The line marking the seaward limit of inland waters.
United States v. California, 382 U.S. 448 (1966).
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law to change the coastline. '49 Thus, the coastline from which to
measure the three-mile grant is to be "taken as heretofore or here-
after modified by natural or artificial means" resulting in an ambula-
tory base line.50 The Court recognized that artificial accretion would
add seabed resources to state jurisdiction that previously were under
federal control but stated that the United States "could protect it-
self through its power over navigable waters."51 Further, negotia-
tions by the United States with foreign nations would be complicated
if such negotiations lead to different definitions than contained in the
present territorial sea convention with the result that States gained
additional resource rights to submerged lands. To prevent such a
handicap to future negotiations, the Court held that the definitions
in the present territorial sea convention would control regardless of
future changes to the Convention. 52
The ambulatory coastline resulting from this decision led to fur-
ther litigation between the United States and Texas. In United
States v. Louisiana,53 Texas contended that her coastline, for pur-
poses of her three-league grant, extended from the seaward edge of
artificial jetties. The Court rejected the claim stating that Texas's
three-league grant was "conditioned" upon her prior history, unlike
California's "unconditional" three-mile grant. Texas's boundary was
to be as it existed at the time she became a member of the Union;
therefore, the coastline for measuring the three leagues was to be as
it was in 1845. This decision denying Texas the benefit of accretion,
natural or artificial, led Texas to believe that she would not be pen-
alized by erosion. Since the coastline for measuring her three-league
grant did not move seaward with accretion giving her additional sub-
merged lands, Texas believed it did not move inland with erosion de-
priving her of previously granted submerged lands. The Supreme
Court, however, had other ideas.
49. Id. at 176.
50. United States v. California, 382 U.S. 448 (1966) (Supplemental De-
cree.
51. United States v. California, 381 U.S. 139, 177 (1965). This rationale
has been criticized since it might make the federal government reluctant
to acquiesce in state and local construction projects. Griffin, Coastal
States' Offshore Boundaries: Status and Problems, OF. PROC. OF = CoF.
ON THE SEA AND THE STATES 6, 15 (1968).
52. United States v. California, 381 U.S. 139, 167 (1965).
53. 389 U.S. 155 (1967). This litigation is captioned United States v.
Louisiana since it was considered a continuation of the 1950 and 1960 liti-
gation of that title.
In United States v. Louisiana, The Texas Boundary Case, the Court
held that when Congress stated that in no event should the bound-
aries of submerged lands granted to the States in the Act be "as ex-
tending from the coastline... more than three marine leagues into
the Gulf of Mexico," it meant not more than three marine leagues
from the modern, ambulatory coastline. 54 Therefore, if through
erosion the Texas coastline had moved inland, the three-league
grant was to be measured from this present eroded coastline. The
Court recognized that its prior decision deprived Texas of the benefit
of post-1845 accretion and this decision penalized Texas regarding
post-1845 erosion, but deemed "any alleged inequitable results" to be
the outcome of the Congressional scheme; "thus Texas must look to
Congress for relief." 5
On the same day the Court announced its decision in The Texas
Boundary Case, it also announced its decision in United States v.
Louisiana, The Louisiana Boundary Case.56 Louisiana urged that
the line marking the seaward limit of inland waters should not be de-
termined on the basis of definitions contained in the Convention on
the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone as the Court held in the
second California case. Rather, Louisiana argued, when Congress
had directed diverse federal agencies over a period of years since 1895
to draw a line indicating where maritime navigation was subject to
inland, rather than international, rules of the road, this determined
the seaward limit of inland waters. 7 The Court rejected use of this
"Inland Water Line" as the relevant "coastine" for measuring Lou-
isiana's three-mile grant. Nothing the Court found in the legislative
history of the Submerged Lands Act required use of this navigational
boundary as the relevant coastline. 8 The Court further refused to
accept this navigational line as establishing traditional inland waters
or "historic bays" since the United States never "treated this line as
a territorial boundary."59 The Court also was unwilling to use its
Congressionally authorized right, as determined by the Court, to in-
terpret "inland waters" to abandon the ambulatory coastline which
resulted from use of the Convention on the Territorial Sea and the
Contiguous Zone in favor of a stable base line which would result
54. 394 U.S. 1, 4 (1969).
55. Id. at 5-6.
56. 394 U.S. 11 (1969).
57. The inland rules are codified at 33 U.S.C.A. §§ 152-232; the interna-
tional rules at 33 U.S.C.A. §§ 1051-1094. The chronology of federal agen-
cies tasked with establishing this 'nland Water Line" is set forth in 394
U.S. at 18 n.15.
58 United States v. Louisiana, 394 U.S. 11, 19-21 (1969).
59. Id. at 21-32, citing United States v. Newark Meadows Improvement
Co., 173 F. 426, 428 (S.D.N.Y. 1909).
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from use of the "Inland Water Line."60 The Court then proceeded to
resolve interpretations of various portions of the Convention, holding
that dredged channels are not part of "a harbor system" as used in
Article 8 of the Convention and, therefore, are not inland waters.
6 1
Low-tide elevations, the Court said, situated in the territorial sea
as measured from bay-closing lines (rather than the mainland as the
United states had argued) are part of the coastline from which to
measure the three-mile grant of the Submerged Lands Act.62 Islands
do not seal off one part of an indentation from the rest for purposes
of the semicircle test.6 3 Where islands intersected by a closing line
between the mainland headlands create multiple mouths to a bay,
the bay should be closed by lines between the natural entrance points
on the islands, even if those points are landward of the direct line be-
tween the mainland entrance points.64 Islands should be designated
as headlands of bays if they are so integrally related to the mainland
that they are realistically parts of the coast.65
The determination of whether to use the straight base line meth-
od for islands fringing a coast is not a judicial function, the Court
said. Louisiana, however, it not to be precluded from presenting
evidence that the United States uses this method to the Special
Master who was subsequently appointed.6 6 The United States, the
Court found, does not have the same complete discretion to block
a claim of historic inland waters based on state actions as it pos-
sesses to decline to draw straight base lines. Evidence of historic
state claims may be presented to the Special Master.67 Several
other particularized disputes were also referred to the Special
Master.
D. Principles
This review of the submerged lands controversy provides the fol-
lowing relevant principles:
60. Id. at 32-35.
61. Id. at 36-40.
62. Id. at 40-47.
63. Id. at 48-53.
64. Id. at 54-60.
65. Id. at 60-66.
66. Id. at 66-73. Walter P. Johnson of Memphis, Tennessee was ap-
pointed Special Master by the Court. 395 U.S. 901 (1969).
67. Id. at 74-78.
1. The three mile (or three league) grants from the federal gov-
ernment to the State governments under the Submerged Lands Act
are to be measured from the line marking the seaward limit of in-
land waters and the line of ordinary low-water;
2. The seaward limit of inland waters is to be determined in ac-
cordance with the provisions of the present Convention on the
Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone; and
3. The line of ordinary low-water shall be the line of mean lower
low-water (or the line used by the Coast and Geodetic Survey in
charting the State's coastline).
Under the Commission proposal, the present principle that the fed-
eral-state submerged land boundary changes with accretion (except
for Texas and the Gulf coast of Florida) and erosion of the coastline
will not apply since the boundary will be fixed in terms of geographic
coordinates portrayed on maps. A determination must be made of
the international implications of establishing this fixed federal-state
submerged land boundary.
II. INTERNATIONAL IMPLICATIONS
A. Convention on the Continental Shelf
In the second Louisiana case, the Court addressed the international
implications arising from recognition of Gulf State seabed bound-
aries beyond the three mile territorial sea and the exercise of rights
by the Gulf States in those areas. After examining the legislative his-
tory of the Submerged Lands Act, the Court found that granting to
the States rights to the resources of the shelf beyond three miles
would not cause any international difficulties or confusion. The
Court examined the 1953 Congressional testimony of the Deputy Le-
gal Adviser of the State Department, Mr. Jack B. Tate, who stated
that jurisdiction over the submerged lands of the continental shelf
was of a "special and limited character" and "since the United States
had already asserted exclusive rights to the continental shelf as
against the world, the question to what extent those rights were to be
exercised by the Federal Government and to what extent by the
States one of wholly domestic concern within the power of Congress
to resolve."68 Although the State Department was not opposed to a
grant by the Federal Government to the States of rights to resources
of the U.S. continental shelf beyond the three mile territorial sea, the
68. United States v. Louisiana, 363 U.S. 1, 31 (1960). Hearings before the
Senate Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs on S.J. Res. 13 and other
bills, 83rd Cong., 1st Sess., at 1051-86 (1953).
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State Department adamantly opposed recognition of other juridical
State boundaries beyond three miles. The State Department spokes-
man noted that the federal government is supreme in the field of for-
eign relations and that the establishment and recognition of State
boundaries beyond three miles would affect foreign relations. Since
the federal government had established its territorial boundary at
three miles, State boundaries over activities other than exploitation
and exploration of the resources of the shelf must be limited to
three miles from the coastline.69
A similar argument was advanced to the Court by the United
States alleging that the consistent refusal of the State Department
to recognize boundaries in excess of three miles precluded any State
from establishing a "historical" boundary beyond United States' ter-
ritorial waters. The Court rejected this argument stating that the
purpose of the Act was purely domestic and not affecting internation-
al relations. Congress is authorized to establish State boundaries and
in the Act it established them over the seabed and the subsoil of the
continental shelf at distances greater than territorial waters. The
jurisdiction conferred upon the States over these lands is far less, the
Court continued, than the jurisdiction claimed by the United States
in the three mile territorial belt. 70 The Court concluded that Texas'
maritime boundary was historically "established at three leagues
from its coast for domestic purposes. Of course, we intimate no view
on the effectiveness of this boundary as against other Nations.
71
Subsequently, the Convention on the Continental Shelf, signed at
Geneva, entered into force for the United States on June 10, 1964.72
Article 2 of the Convention confers on the coastal nation exclusive
riths to explore and exploit the natural resources of its continental
shelf. Continental shelf is defined as "the seabed and subsoil of sub-
marine areas adjacent to the coast, but outside the area of the terri-
torial sea, to a depth of 200 meters or, beyond that limit, to where the
depth of the superjacent waters admit of exploitation of the natural
69. 363 U.S. at 32 n.54.
70. Id. at 33-36.
71. Id. at 64.
72. 15 U.S.T. 471, T.I.A.S. No. 5578. The Senate advised ratification on
May 26, 1960 and the President ratified the Convention on March 24, 1961.
Ratification was deposited with the Secretary General of the United Na-
tions on April 12, 1961. The Convention was proclaimed by the President
on May 25, 1964.
resources of the said areas. ' 73 Even though the extent of the con-
tinental shelf to which the adjacent state has exclusive rights is the
subject of present negotiations and a future conference, if the bound-
ary dividing federal-state rights to submerged lands is drawn on that
area of the seabed to which the U.S. has exclusive exploration and
exploitation rights, the world community would have no interest in
where it is drawn. The Court's conclusion in the 1960 Louisiana case
that this is purely a matter of domestic concern has not been altered
by the present Convention on the Continental Shelf.
B. Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone
The Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone
as applied by the Supreme Court complicates, but does not preclude,
establishing a fixed federal-state submerged land boundary. This
Convention resulted from the 1958 Geneva Conference and entered
into force for the United States on September 30, 1962.74 In the sec-
ond California case, the Supreme Court was tasked with defining "in-
land waters" as used in the Act. The Court viewed this litigation as a
continuation of the first California case in which it had appointed
a Special Master. 75 His task was to define the low-water mark and
the seaward limit of inland waters which under the first California
decision was all the submerged lands to which California was en-
titled. The Special Master drew upon international law to deter-
mine whether areas were inland waters or open seas. Finding this
law unclear, he adopted the definitions of inland waters as used by
the United States in its foreign affairs as of the date of the original
California decree.76
In the second California case, the position of the United States was
that the Submerged Lands Act had simply moved the line of demar-
cation out three miles from the line established by the California
decree entered in the first case. Therefore, the determination of the
Special Master as to the location of the seaward limit of inland
waters would be the "coastline" from which the grant made to the
73. Id. at Art. 1.
74. 15 U.S.T. 471, T.I.A.S. No. 5578. Ratification of this Convention was
advised by the Senate on May 26, 1960. On March 24, 1961, the President
ratified the Convention thereafter depositing the ratification with the
Secretary General of the United Nations on April 12, 1961. The Convention
was proclaimed by the President on May 25, 1964.
75. United States v. California, 332 U.S. 19 (1947). The report of the
Special Master was submitted to the Supreme Court on October 14, 1952.
United States v. California, 334 U.S. 872 (1952).
76. The full text of the report of the Special Master is set forth in 1 S.
S ALOwnTZ, SHORE AND SEA BouNDamEs 329-53 (1962).
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States by the Act would be measuredJ 7 The Court, however, viewed
its 1947 decision as requiring that "inland waters" have an interna-
tional content since the outer limit of inland waters would determine
the United States' coastline. Rather than utilizing the standard
set forth by the Special Master and urged by the United States, the
Court felt that the Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Conti-
guous Zone provided the best and most workable definitions avail-
able. Furthermore, use of these definitions would provide the salu-
tary result, in the Court's view, of a single coastline for international
affairs and for administration of the Submerged Lands Act.1 8
Utilization of the definitions of the Convention on the Territorial
Sea and the Contiguous Zone to define the terms of the Submerged
Lands Act may be desirable; however, it is not required. "Inland
waters" could have vastly different meanings for purposes of deter-
mining the coastline from which to measure the States' portion of
the United States continental shelf than the meaning given these
words by the Convention governing the international determination
of the base line for measuring the territorial sea. Justice Harlan,
delivering the opinion of the Court in the second California case,
obfuscated this distinction when he stated that California could
not use the straight base line which was authorized by the Territorial
Seas Convention "to extend our international boundaries beyond
their traditional international limits. ' '79 Certainly, California's use
of straight base lines for purposes of measuring the extent of the
Congressional grant need not result in an extention of the United
States' maritime boundary.
This distinction was recognized in the 1967 Texas artifical accre-
tion case. There the Court repeated that Congress had left the de-
finition of "coastline" to the Court and in the second California case,
the Court had "borrowed the international definition of 'coast line'
used in the Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous
Zone." If the Convention had applied, Texas would have been en-
titled to use artificial accretions as her "coastline" from which to
measure her three league grant. However, the Court refused to
apply to Convention, stating:
[ilt cannot be ignored that the application of the Convention here
77. United States v. California, 381 U.S. 139, 149 (1965).
78. Id. at 162-65.
79. Id. at 168.
would allow Texas, unlike all other States except Florida, to ex-
tend its own state boundaries beyond the congressional limitation
simply because of a rule governing the relationship between mari-
time nations of the world. This is a domestic dispute which must
be measured by the Congressional grant.8 0
Clearly, wherever the United States chooses to draw the line be-
tween federal and state rights to the submerged lands of the conti-
nental shelf of the United States is not dictated by the Convention on
the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone.8
Article 3 of the Territorial Sea Convention may be viewed as trou-
blesome since it states "the normal baseline for measuring the
breadth of the territorial sea is the low-water line along the coast as
marked on large-scale charts officially recognized by the coastal
State. '8 2 Congressional action detailing the coast line from which
the permanent federal-state boundary is to be measured could be
misconstrued as establishing the base lines for measuring the ter-
ritorial sea. 3 It is doubtful, however, that such Congressional
action could create any greater danger of misconstruction by foreign
nations than the Supreme Court created in the second California
case:
We interpret the two lines thus indicated [line of ordinary low-
water used in the Submerged Lands Act and "low-water line along
the coast as marked on large-scale charts officially recognized by
the coastal State" used in the territorial seas Convention] to con-
form, and on the official United States coastal charts of the Pa-
cific Coast prepared by the United States Coast and Geodetic Sur-
vey, it is the lower low-water line which is marked.8 4
The Convention on the Continental Shelf establishes in ambiguous
terms the outermost limit of the continental shelf to which a coastal
Nation has exclusive natural resource rights. If the federal-state
submerged land boundary is established on the coastal side of this
outermost limit, no adverse international implications would result.
Similarly, the definitions contained in the Convention on the Terri-
torial Sea and the Contiguous Zone can be helpful but need not be
80. United States v. Louisiana, 389 U.S. 105, 160 (1967) (emphasis added).
81. But see, United States v. Louisiana, 394 U.S. 11, 72-73 (1969) where
the Court said:
While we agree that the straight baseline method was designed for
precisely such coasts as the Mississippi River Delta area, we ad-
here to the position that the selection of this optional method of
establishing boundaries should be left to the branches of Govern-
ment responsible for the formulation and implementation of for-
eign policy.
This result comports with the Court's decision in the second California
case, supra note 79 and accompanying text.
82. 15 U.S.T. 471, T.I.A.S. No. 5578 (1962).
83. COMSER, supra note 1, recommended that the coast line be fixed
for the territorial sea also.
84. United States v. California, 381 U.S. 139, 175-76 (1965).
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adhered to when used solely for delimitation of baseline from which
to draw this submerged land boundary. Article 3 of the Territorial
Sea Convention should not complicate establishing a permanent
boundary. Under the Commision proposal, the boundary delimiting
State interests in the shelf would be established permanently but the
coastline itself could remain ambulatory. Therefore, the U.S. terri-
torial sea baseline would be as it exists "on large-scale charts official-
ly recognized" by the United States. No adverse international im-
plications need result from permanently establishing the federal-
state submerged land boundary.
III. DoivtEsTIc ASPECTS
The major domestic argument against establishing, or freezing, the
federal-state submerged land boundary is that such establishment
might constitute a taking of state lands. A State's territory can
not be taken from it by Congress without the State's consent.8 5 It is
clear that States own the tidelands within their boundaries to the
low-water mark.8 6 Equally clear is the rule that accretion belongs
to the riparian owner.8 7  Consequently, a federal-state boundary
drawn along the actual coastline would constitute a taking if sub-
sequent accretion did not alter the boundary to the State's benefit.
But is a boundary permanently drawn three miles (or three leagues)
seaward of the low-water mark, beyond the reach of accretion, a
taking of state property?
The nature of the State's interest in lands beyond the low-water
mark determines whether establishing a permanent offshore bound-
ary would constitute a taking. In the pre-Act California, Louisiana
and Texas cases, the Supreme Court held that the State's had neither
title to nor property interest in submerged lands seaward of the line
marking low-water along the coast and inland waters. The Court in
interpreting the subsequent Submerged Lands Act stated that this
Act "did not impair the validity of the California, Louisiana and
Texas cases," leaving for the Court's determination "only the geo-
graphic extent to which the statute ceded to the States the federal
rights established by those decisions."88  Therefore, the interests
85. Cf. DeGeofrey v. Riggs, 133 U.S. 258 (1890); Fort Leavenworth R. Co.
v. Lowe, 114 U.S. 525 (1885).
86. Borax, Ltd. v. Los Angeles, 296 U.S. 10 (1935).
87. Hughes v. Washington, 389 U.S. 290 (1967).
88. United States v. Louisiana, 363 U.S. 1, 7 (1960).
of the States in submerged lands beyond the low-water mark or
seaward limit of inland waters are only those rights granted by the
federal government to the States in the Act.
The Supreme Court's interpretation of the Act is that the grant to
the States is to be measured from the modern, ambulatory coast-
line.89 Congress, if it disagrees with the interpretation given its
statute by the Court, can amend that statute to define its actual
intent.90 The Court's selection of the ambulatory coastline to mea-
sure the extent of the Congressional grant cannot be viewed as
vesting a right in the States to an ambulatory grant. Since Con-
gress is the only branch of the federal government authorized to
dispose of public lands,91 amendment of the Submerged Lands Act
to provide not only for determination of the relevant coastline
from which the three mile, or three league, grant is to be measured
but also to provide that boundary once established would be per-
manent would not constitute a taking.92 This view is bolstered by
the dictum of the Supreme Court in the Louisiana Boundary Case:
Finally, we note that if the inconvenience of an ambulatory coast-
line proves to be substantial, there is nothing in this decision
which would obstruct resolution of the problems through appro-
priate legislation or agreement between the parties. Such legisla-
tion or agreement might, for example, freeze the coastline as of an
agreed-upon date.93
The one conceivable difficulty that might arise from freezing the
coastline and projecting seaward therefrom the permanent boundary
is that accretion might build beyond the fixed boundary, for exam-
ple in the Mississippi River Delta. This possibility need not prevent
the boundary from being permanently established, but would re-
quire language stating that this fixed submerged land boundary
does not prejudice the right of the States to accretion beyond that
boundary. There appears to be, therefore, no domestic legal im-
pediment to Congressional freezing of the federal-state submerged
land boundary.
CONCLUSIONS
To freeze the federal-state submerged land boundary requires a
89. United States v. Louisiana, 394 U.S. 1, 4 (1969); United States v.
California, 381 U.S. 139, 176 (1965).
90. Prudential Insurance Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U.S. 408 (1946), noted in,
21 N.Y.U. L.Q. 542 (1946). And see Swenson, Railroad Land Grants: A
Chapter in Public Land Law, 4 UTAH L. REv. 456 (1967), wherein the au-
thor traces Congressional limitations subsequently placed on earlier unre-
stricted land grants.
91. U.S. CoNsT. art. 4, § 3, cl. 2.
92. It is not suggested, nor is it deemed likely from a political point of
view, that the extent of the grant to the States be decreased.
93. United States v. Louisiana, 394 U.S. 11, 34(1969).
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two-step process. First the base line, that is low-water mark along
the coast and the seaward limit of inland waters, must be deter-
mined. The seaward boundary must then be projected from this
previously determined base line.
To establish the base line, Congress could authorize the pro-
posed National Seashore Boundary Commission, perhaps in con-
junction with the Coast and Geodetic Survey, to chart the coastline
of the United States. Alternately, Congress might wish to use
charts already prepared, for example, the most recent Coast and
Geodetic Surevey Charts of a State's coastline. For delimiting
inland waters, Congress should set forth in an amendment to the
Submerged Lands Act those definitions in the Convention on
the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, and the interpreta-
tions of the Supreme Court, that it deems appropriate.
After the base line is established, the seaward submerged land
boundary should be delimited by means of an envelope line which
is defined as a "line every point of which is at a distance from the
nearest point of the baseline equal to the breadth of the [Congres-
sional grant] .94 The envelope line is formed by a continuous series
of intersecting arcs which are farthest seaward of all possible arcs
with the same radius that can be drawn from the base line. Under
envelope line principle, "only one line can be drawn from a given
coast-line."95 Minor variations in the baseline will not be repro-
duced in the envelope line because every point on such line must
be at the given distance from the nearest point on the base line
and at least that distance away from every point on the base
line. The proposed Boundary Commission should have authority,
up to a specified distance, to straighten curvatures in the enevelope
line to simplify geographic description of the line.
94. The envelope line has been recommended by Shalowitz for delimiting
the exterior boundary. 1 S. SHALowrrz, SHORE AND SEA BouNDAIms § 1621
(c) (1962). He also discusses the replica line which is a line resulting from
transferring the low-water line seaward the requisite distance and laying
it down parallel to its former position. The irregularities which result
from this procedure, among other things, renders this technique unsatis-
factory. Id. § 1621(a). A conventional line, also discussed and re-jected by Shalowitz, is a relatively smooth, straight or curved, line based
on some adopted principles. The location of the line becomes a matter of
individual judgment; considerable differences may be obtained even by
two experts. Id. § 1621(b).
95. Id. § 1621(c).
The Commission on Marine Science, Engineering and Resources
recommended that the coastline be fixed not only for purposes of
drawing the submerged land boundary but also for measuring the
limit of the territorial sea.96 The flexibility gained by the present
United States' position on its territorial sea base line should not be
lost lacking a demonstrated need. Article 6 of the Convention on the
Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone provides that the outer
limit of the territorial sea is the "line every point of which is at a dis-
tance from the nearest point of the baseline equal to the breadth of
the territorial sea."19 7 This describes an envelope lineY8  A navi-
gator who has plotted his position on a chart can draw an arc with
the radius equal to the breadth of the territorial sea. If the arc
crosses land or inland waters, he is in territorial waters. The Con-
vention's definition of the outer limit of the territorial sea, therefore,
provides a practical way for a navigator to determine whether he is
within territorial waters. The base line for purposes of the ter-
ritorial sea should remain the ambulatory "low-water line along
the coast as marked on large-scale charts officially recognized by
the coastal State."99
The recommendation of the Commission on Marine Science, Engi-
neering and Resources that submerged land boundaries be stabilized
by the proposed National Seashore Boundary Commission clearly
has great merit. The impediment to full utilization of the natural
resources off the coasts of the United States would be diminished be-
cause the uncertainties as to whether a portion of submerged lands
is in federal or state jurisdiction will be eliminated. The establish-
ment of a semi-judicial commission tasked with fixing the boundaFy,
subject to judicial review, would remove from the Supreme Court's
original jurisdiction the minutiae of delimitation, a task the Court is
ill-suited to perform. Rather than a twenty-year process which
even then would be subject to change by accretion and erosion, a
more rapid delimitation of boundaries, fixed for all time, should re-
sult from the Commission's proposal.
A risk always exists when international terms are used to settle
purely domestic disputes. The interpretation given those terms may
96. COMSER, supra note 1. The Commission also recommended that the
lateral boundaries between States be delimited by the proposed National
Seashore Boundary Commission. Shalowitz recommends that the principle
of equidistance be used for such delimitation. 1 S. SHALOWITZ, SHOR AND
SEA BouDARms § 1622 (1962).
97. U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 13/L. 52.
98. 1 S. S nA owITz, SHoRE AND SEA BouNDAms § 1621(c) n.147 (1962).
99. Article 3, Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone,
supra note 97.
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be viewed by others as establishing the international position of the
United States. It is preferable that the substance to be accorded in-
ternational terms be supplied by the executive in dealing with for-
eign nations rather than by the judiciary in settling domestic dis-
putes. Early settlement of the existing uncertainties based on a
statute of Congress, rather than an international convention, will
reduce the risk of misinterpretation by other nations.
Rejection of a frozen territorial sea base line destroys the unity of
submerged lands and territorial sea base lines urged by the Su-
preme Court and the Commission. Different considerations clearly
apply in delimiting the domestic submerged land boundary than
apply in delimiting the international territorial sea boundary which
negates the necessity for a unified base line. The fears are unfounded
that two similar lines marking different interests will appear on
the charts and result in confusion. The submerged land boundary
will be described by geographic coordinates and need not be charted.
The outer limit of territorial waters also need not be charted since
a navigator under the Territorial Sea Convention definition need
merely draw an arc from his plotted position using the breadth of
territorial sea as his radius to determine whether he is within terri-
torial waters. The freezing of the base line for delimitation of the
submerged land boundary need not be carried over in delimitating
the territorial sea. Congress should not permanently establish the
base line of the territorial sea unless a clear need is demonstrated
and those tasked with the conduct of foreign relations unequivoca-
bly support such action.
Attempts to amend the Submerged Lands Act of 1953 in all proba-
bility would lead to renewed claims by the coastal States for addi-
tional grants. Certainly, it is reasonable to expect the three mile
states to petition Congress for the three leagues now enjoyed by
Texas and Florida in the Gulf. States may even seek out to the
twelve mile fishing zone now claimed by the United States. Those
recalling the heated, and often bitter, debates of the "tidelands con-
troversy" may simply feel that it is not worth reopening the issue.
However, the real question is, what are the costs of continuing
under the present system.
